Hard Times
IN A WAR-RIDDEN WORLD
THE ROAD TO AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Frederico Carvalho* and Mehdi Lahlou**
96th Executive Council Meeting of the World Federation of Scientific Workers
Beijing, People’s Republic of China, August 11th-17th, 2024
A Contribution to the debate within
Working Group 1: “Peace, Development and Cooperation”
Dan Smith, Director of SIPRI, the well-known Swedish International Peace Research Institute, recently pointed out (cf. SIPRI Yearbook 2024): ‘We are now in one of the most dangerous periods in human history. There are numerous sources of instability—political rivalries, economic inequalities, ecological disruption, and an accelerating arms race. The abyss is beckoning and it is time for the great powers to step back and reflect. Preferably together.’ [i]
The risk of an eventual outbreak of an all-out nuclear war cannot be excluded, with dire consequences for the sustainability of life on Earth, with the possible exception of the most primitive life forms. It is important that scientific workers, in particular, freely and seriously engage in a debate on the probability of such a disaster which is not unavoidable, in order to expose the roots of the threat and contribute to a sound analysis of the measures that must be taken to avoid it.
In 2023 armed conflicts were active in different parts of the world. An estimate of the number of states involved exceeds 50. A particularly grievous consequence of violent conflicts, raging in some cases for decades, is the forced displacement of people. In the African continent, wars in Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo forced displacements accumulated over two decades exceeded 14 million people[ii]. In Gaza, approximately 2 million people have been forcibly displaced over the past 9 months (as of July 7, 2024), while more than tens of thousands have been killed and many more injured.
When dealing with imminent threats it is obligatory to point out that in our days, climate change, is at play in different scenarios — landmass warming, ocean warming, the melting of glaciers, etc. — is a main cause of socio-political instability. It is a source of conflicts, and a cause, as war-fighting, of forced displacements, deprivation and premature death. Even in the absence of an actual conflict, the contribution of the military to greenhouse gas emissions is a non-negligible fraction of the total. When evaluating the carbon footprint of the military one has to consider besides emissions resulting from the direct use of military equipment in a war theatre, emissions attached to routine maintenance and operation of military bases; carbon emissions of the arms industry that produces the military equipment, as well as those attached to the extraction of the raw materials used by that industry. And, last but not least, emissions resulting from the reconstruction work of a massive number of civilian facilities destroyed.[iii]
The question of the incompatibility of war in its various forms with the success of climate change mitigation efforts deserves our attention. Success is dependent on cooperation. It cannot be the result of isolated measures taken by individual powers. The same is true of peace-building efforts.
In the current geopolitical framework, there is a serious danger of ongoing conflicts evolving towards out-of-control confrontations.
Scientific workers are expected to be able to examine with a calm mind and a non-partisan perspective, the roots and reasons of the aggravation of interconnected threats that face humankind. In our opinion one thing is certain: following the path defined by pursuing “business as usual” — which includes war — is in itself an existential threat to humanity. Survival will depend on radical societal changes, abolishing war, and establishing peace.
THE OFFICIAL POSTURE OF THE NUCLEAR-ARMED POWERS ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
When considering the possibility of a nuclear conflagration the question of the so-called “nuclear posture” of the nuclear-armed powers deserves attention. One may recall the statement first made by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at their summit in Geneva in 1985: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Although relations between the main superpowers considerably deteriorated in the following decades, curiously enough the same position was expressed in 2022 by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council in a joint statement on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races. Obviously, such a statement should not be taken at face value.
Of the five parties, the People’s Republic of China alone has pledged to never be the first to use nuclear weapons and has urged other nuclear weapon states to make the same commitment by proposing that they negotiate a no-first-use treaty, a position assumed since the PRC conducted its first nuclear detonation in 1964[iv]. This was reaffirmed in March 2023, in a declaration at a Security Council Meeting [v] by the representative of the PRC where he called for the gradual, complete elimination of nuclear weapons and for the abolition of nuclear-sharing arrangements, as well as for the withdrawal of all such weapons deployed in foreign countries[vi].
The position of the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council is that of a refusal of a no-first-use policy.
In the 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review [vii], recently published, one can read the following, under Declaratory Policy (p. 9) (emphasis added): “The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners. The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations”. Adding that: “For all other states, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring attacks that have strategic effect against the United States or its Allies and partners. The declaratory policy is informed by the threat, assessed adversary perceptions, Ally and partner perspectives, and our strategic risk reduction objectives”. Furthermore, it states that following a thorough review of the option of both “No First Use and Sole Purpose policies” it was concluded “that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its Allies and partners”, finally noticing that: “Some Allies and partners are particularly vulnerable to attacks with non-nuclear means that could produce devastating effects.” Thus, retaliation using nuclear weapons is not excluded even in the case of a non-nuclear attack on the US, its allies and partners.
Pleading in favour of the no-first-use option, the Union of Concerned Scientists— a well-known American not-for-profit organization — writes: “Without no-first-use, the US public is at greater risk of a devastating attack, either because another country—fearing the US will use nuclear weapons— decides to escalate first, or the United States chooses to start a nuclear war, leading to cataclysmic retaliation”. This is plainly common sense.
In the case of the Russian Federation the first use of nuclear weapons is not excluded whenever an existential threat to the homeland is perceived independently of the nature of the eventual attack, be it nuclear or non-nuclear. The official position reads as follows:
“As part of the implementation of strategic deterrence measures of a forceful nature, the Russian Federation envisages the use of high-precision weapons.
The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the very existence of the State is threatened.
The decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation”[viii].
In this regard, the tendency towards warlike escalation remains strong. In this sense, one must read the decision taken on June 10, 2024 – in parallel with the festivities organised in Washington, marking the 75th anniversary of the creation of NATO – to deploy American long-range missiles in Germany. Such a decision quickly provoked a reaction from the authorities in Russia, who estimated that it could make European capitals targets for Russian missiles and victims of a confrontation between Washington and Moscow.
Thus, for Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, in a statement dated June 13, 2024, “Europe is a target for our missiles, our country is a target for American missiles in Europe. We’ve been through this before[ix], we’ve been through it. We can contain these missiles, but the potential victims are the capitals of these European countries’’[x].
The UK´s official stance is that its nuclear deterrent “is operationally independent, and the UK does not require US or NATO authorisation to use” adding nevertheless that it “supports collective security through NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area”.
The UK (quote) “deliberately maintain some ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale (it) would contemplate the use of (its) nuclear deterrent”[xi] thus keeping a potential aggressor guessing under what circumstances the UK might consider the use of her nuclear capabilities. The UK does not define what it considers to be its vital interests, hence it (quote) “will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons”.
As far as the resort to the use of nuclear weapons is concerned the position of France is essentially coincident with that of the United Kingdom.
The nuclear posture of the nuclear powers not a member of the UN Security Council is also of interest.
The case of India’s nuclear doctrine deserves attention because having originally pledged “no-first-use” as a cardinal principle (1993), in the 2003 version an important qualifier was adopted according to which “India will consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to a ‘major attack’ on India or on Indian forces anywhere with chemical or biological weapons “. Such a posture means India could use nuclear weapons not only against non-nuclear states but, as well — contrary to the no-first-use principle — against any nuclear power that decides to use chemical or biological weapons against India [xii].
Pakistan, India’s neighbour in the Asian subcontinent, decided not to endorse a no-first-use policy. The country’s officially undeclared nuclear doctrine tends to evolve in order to respond to the challenges and constraints imposed by the inter-state relationships in the region.
Although Pakistan and India are minor nuclear powers, in the event of a limited nuclear exchange involving, say, a 100 15kt of TNT equivalent warheads could result in a number of nearly 30 million direct deaths and trigger a nuclear winter effect that could lead to an estimated 225 million additional deaths from starvation [xiii]
The case of Israel, a non-declared nuclear power, deserves consideration as well. It is a peculiar case. Israel has adopted what might apparently be described as a “suicidal option” as far as the eventual use of its nuclear weapons is concerned. It goes under the name of the Samson Option: Israel’s deterrence strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons as a “last resort” against a country whose military has invaded and/or destroyed much of Israel (emphasis added).
In view of the present situation in the Middle-East, an eventual resort by Israel to the Sampson Option is quite improbable [xiv]. In the opposite sense, Amihai Eliyahu, a right-wing member of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s coalition government, suggested, at the start of the war on Gaza, that “one way” to eliminate Hamas would be the nuclear option.
Mr. Eliyahu was suspended, an act that likely had more to do with his inadvertent admission of the existence of Israel’s nuclear capabilities [xv].
The nuclear doctrine of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) established in a 2013 law stipulated that North Korea could use nuclear weapons to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear state and make retaliatory strikes. A 2022 review of the law goes beyond that to allow pre-emptive nuclear strikes in case North Korea detects an imminent attack by weapons of mass destruction of any kind aimed at its leadership and the command organization of its nuclear forces. Among the scenarios that could trigger a nuclear attack would be the threat of an imminent nuclear strike; if the country’s leadership, people or existence were under threat; or to gain the upper hand during a war[xvi].
That is an apparent reference to South Korea’s “Kill Chain” strategy, which calls for pre-emptively striking North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure and command system if an imminent attack is suspected [xvii].
THE DEMISE OF ARMS AGREEMENTS AND A RENEWED ARMS RACE
During the “Cold War” period, understandings were possible between the two largest nuclear powers leading to bilateral agreements in the nuclear field. Such agreements gave substance to the so-called “nuclear deterrence” policy that made the outbreak of a deliberate nuclear conflict unlikely.
In the post-Cold War period, the situation, contrary to what could be expected, evolved in a direction that is not favourable to Peace.
After the reunification of Germany and the end of the German Democratic Republic in 1990, whose acceptance by the Soviet leadership was based on the US promise not to expand NATO to the east, there was an evolution in exactly the opposite direction [xviii]. Since then and to the present, NATO has doubled the number of members, from 16 to 32 (with the recent inclusion of former neutral countries, Sweden and Finland).
This century saw the US denouncing two important bilateral treaties that they had signed and ratified. This happened with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, denounced by the USA in 2002. In 2020, the USA withdrew from the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed twenty years earlier by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. In this context, it is interesting to mention the international treaty on the total ban on nuclear tests which includes a ban on underground tests. The Treaty, opened for signature in 1996, has not entered into force to this day. Only three of the nuclear weapons states — the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom — had ratified the treaty. In 2023, with the war already underway in Eastern Europe, Russia decided to withdraw its ratification, citing non-ratification by the USA. However, it committed not to carry out new nuclear explosive tests if the Americans did not do so.
The number of nuclear explosives in conditions of immediate use or in storage in the arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers reached truly reached astronomical figures in the last quarter of the 20th century, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union. We are talking about what are called “nuclear warheads” to be launched by missiles protected in underground silos, by submarines or by strategic bomber aircraft. The numbers are staggering, indeed, when you know that a very small fraction of these explosives, if used, would be enough to end life on Earth. Together, in 1990, those arsenals contained around 50,000 operational nuclear warheads. In the years following the dissolution of the USSR, there was a substantial drop in these numbers which, in the middle of the first decade of our century, stood at around 10,000.
In 2010 (April 8), the so-called “New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” (NEW START or START 3) was signed in Prague by Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, which sets for each of the two nuclear powers the maximum number of 1.550 nuclear warheads in the so-called “hair-trigger alert” or “launch-on-warning status”. Nuclear cataclysm remains possible, but now under much more “economic” conditions[xix]. This allows funds to be diverted to invest in better nuclear weapons but also in the development of other types of weapons.
This is what is happening: a new nuclear arms race is on.
Even though in 2021 the duration of the Treaty was extended by 5 years, until February 2026, its future in the current situation is doubtful. The current “hot war” that opposes, on the ground, USA-led NATO, to the Russian Federation, does not seem compatible with respect for the agreement reached. A sign of this is the announcement by Russia on February 22, 2023, of the suspension of its participation in the treaty. President Vladimir Putin stated, at the time, that this was not meant as a withdrawal from the only arms control agreement with the United States that still exists, but simply the refusal of on-site inspections by the parties, provided for in the treaty.
Meanwhile, the US has planned for the next 30 years to spend around 2 trillion dollars for the “modernization” of their ‘’nuclear triad’’ (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers with nuclear bombs and missiles). More generally: it is known that states that currently possess nuclear weapons are expanding and/or modernizing their respective arsenals including both warheads and launch vectors.
This means fabulous profits for the large private corporations in the arms industry. World military expenditure, which has been growing continuously since 2014, is today about twice its 2001 amount, reaching in 2023 (in current prices), the value of 2.4 trillion US dollars [xx]
Some consider that the path that is being followed has significantly lowered the so-called “nuclear threshold”. We believe however that the odds are that a global nuclear war will not take place. In fact, it is possible to pretend that a certain ‘strategic stability’ is being maintained, but only if a player sets the task of inflicting a strategic defeat on the enemy at the hands of a client state and expects that the enemy will not dare to use nuclear weapons.
However, as several qualified observers have emphasized, one should not exclude the possibility that an eventual nuclear disaster of catastrophic proportions could be the consequence of an accidental, non-deliberate firing, resulting from an error in the assessment of a natural phenomenon or the malfunction of any system that suggests an enemy attack is imminent or, quite simply, a misguided decision (given, in particular, the age – 78 and 81 – of the two candidates in the American presidential election in November 2024).
History records countless cases in which the world was, for such reasons, on the brink of disaster. Today, the situation is more serious due to the abandonment of dedicated communication channels between the US and the Russian Federation [xxi].
Anyhow, military experts understand that the usefulness of any kind of nuclear weapons to achieve military objectives in a theatre of war, whether in Ukraine or Gaza, for example, is very doubtful.
THREATS ARISING FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF “DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES”
War and aggression in its multiple forms today take advantage of sophisticated technological means that advances in scientific knowledge have made possible. To the nuclear military, created 80 years ago, other so-called “disruptive” technologies were added, with rapid development in this century. Examples include: in the field of life sciences, the so-called genetic engineering involving gene editing techniques; in the field of information technology and cybernetics, lethal autonomous weapons systems or military robots, with an emphasis on military applications of so-called “artificial intelligence”; and also directed energy weapons (DEW) — high energy lasers or high-power microwave systems often referred to as radiofrequency weapons. Some DEW have already been deployed in the field while others are in testing. In fact, research is being conducted in many countries in this field. According to some sources the US Department of Defence has been investing in recent years more than $1000 million per year in DEW technologies [xxii]. David C. Stoudt (see ref xx) points out that “autonomous and AI-enabled systems are growing vulnerable to directed-energy laser and microwave weapons since they rely on optical and radio frequency sensors”. According to the same source, “today’s microwave weapons are now being employed to defeat swarms of armed drones, causing them to fall from the sky by overpowering and disrupting their internal electronics”[xxiii].
Swift advances in the field of Artificial Intelligence are also a source of concern. Quite a number of highly reputed scientific workers have publicly drawn attention to the dangers of an unregulated development of AI advances. Differently from what has happened historically with the developments in the nuclear field, in the Western world, AI research, development, and innovation assets are in private hands and are thus fully dependent on the interests of big capital. This fact makes it harder to establish regulations and implement effective independent regulatory mechanisms.
As far as military applications of AI are concerned, in a number of the world’s most scientific and technically advanced countries an AI arms race is taking place. In some places where conflicts are taking place AI enabled systems or devices are already being fielded. This is true, in particular, in the case of the tragic ongoing conflicts in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, in Palestine in particular.
Besides lethal autonomous weapons of different types, mass surveillance techniques, including facial recognition systems, deserve particular attention. A specialized branch of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) that goes by the name of “target administration division” has been formed in 2019 in the IDF’s intelligence directorate. Two AI-based systems called “the Gospel” and “Lavender” have been used in the war against Hamas to “produce targets at a fast pace”. Targets may as well be individuals or structures including private homes [xxiv].
In our days waging of war takes multiple forms involving both military and non-military means. One speaks of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare conducted by antagonistic blocks make use of various instruments and follows new ways opened up by technology. Cyberattacks that disrupt vital infrastructures; the spreading of plainly false or simply misleading news; and economic sanctions are a few examples. War is a main cause of famine and starvation as a weapon of war is sometimes used. We know of old as well of ongoing instances of such inhumane conduct[xxv], as we see what is happening in this regard in Gaza since the end of 2023.
THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
In a statement made public in January 2024 by its International Secretariat, the WFSW called for “a dynamic cooperation inside the global community of scientific researchers in order to effectively address humanity’s major challenges including recurring disasters caused by climate change as well as the threat of widespread wars”. Taking advantage of their special training and multidisciplinary skills, scientists at the global level have a duty ¾ the statement added ¾ “to influence decision-makers and alert (their) fellow citizens to the nature and implications for our common future of the dangers of continuing to follow the path traced by the dominant powers of today”. It is not an easy task and one that requires an effort to organize and gain the support of and inside scientific workers’ associations.
This cannot be achieved without deepening the debate inside the organisations of the relative importance of the nature of threats in the current geopolitical framework; its roots and reasons for its aggravation, as well as the danger of ongoing conflicts evolving towards out-of-control confrontations.
In this context, climate change at a global level, with direct repercussions on geopolitical balances, central to the war-peace dilemma, may be considered by many as the most serious existential threat facing Humanity today: the increase in the frequency of climatic phenomena of abnormal intensity, attributable to human activities, with loss of life and great material damage. This deserves to be the subject of a broad debate.
In our opinion, neither war nor climate change, which some seek to portray as an inescapable consequence of scientific and technological development, can be successfully combated within the framework of an imperialist globalization based on the dictatorship of big capital.
Beijing, August 12, 2024
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*Frederico Carvalho, PhD in Physics, Lisbon University and Dr.Ing.in Nuclear Engineering, Karlsruhe University. Germany, is Senior Researcher (retired) of the Dept. of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon University. He is President of the Board of Directors of OTC-Organização dos Trabalhadores Científicos, Portugal, Vice-President of the Executive Council of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and a member of World Federation’s International Secretariat.
**Mehdi Lahlou is Professor of Economics at the National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics (INSEA), Rabat, Morocco, and Associate Professor, University Mohammed V (Rabat). He is a member of the Executive Council of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and a member of the World Federation’s International Secretariat.
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Graphic Composition: OTC, Portugal
Portuguese version: https://otc.pt/wp/2024/12/08/tempos-dificeis/
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[i] https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/role-nuclear-weapons-grows-geopolitical-relations-deteriorate-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now
[ii] Dan Smith, SIPRI Yearbook 2024, Introduction
[iii] See “How does war contribute to climate change?”, CEOBS-Conflict and Environment Observatory, June 14, 2021 Conflict and Environment Observatory (https://ceobs.org/how-does-war-contribute-to-climate-change/ ); “The carbon boot-print of the military”, Stuart Parkinson, Responsible Science Journal nº2, Jan. 8, 2020 (updated 2022) (https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/carbon-boot-print-military-0 ); “Existential Risks: “The Case Of War-Climate Interactions”, Frederico Carvalho, 94th Executive Council Meeting of the WFSW, Évora (Portugal) July 2—7, 2023 (https://otc.pt/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/EC94-12ENWG1EXISTENTIAL-RISKS-THE-CASE-OF-WAR-CLIMATE-INTERACTIONS.pdf ) . Global cement manufacturing is responsible for about 8% of the world’s total CO2 emissions.
( https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/09/cement-production-sustainable-concrete-co2-emissions/ )
[iv] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697877.html
[v] https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15250.doc.htm
[vi] Nuclear sharing means the stationing of nuclear weapons in foreign countries. Agreements on nuclear sharing between the US and several NATO countries have been in force for several decades. Presently the US keep about 100 B61 thermonuclear gravity bombs stationed in military bases in four EU member countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy (2 bases), the Netherlands), and in Turkey. The B61 are adjustable yield bombs with selectable explosive yields of 0.3, 5, 10 or 80 kilotons. Recently (April 2024) Poland has shown interest in hosting US nuclear weapons under a nuclear sharing agreement. The B61 bombs may be used both as tactical or strategic weapons. Recently the Russian Federation has deployed a number of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move described by several observers as a consequence of the current conflict in Eastern Europe seen as a US-Russia proxy war fighting in Ukrainian soil.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon)
[vii] https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2022-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf
[viii] “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” https://web.archive.org/web/20110504070127/http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html
[ix] This statement seems to refer to the so-called ‘Pershing Crisis’, when a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO, held in Brussels on December 12, 1979, decided the deployment in Europe – in Federal Republic of Germany, and in Italy, UK, Netherlands an Belgium – of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). German History, https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/two-germanies-1961-1989/nato-s-dual-track-decision-december-12-1979
[x] Voir LeMonde.fr, 14 juillet 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2024/07/13/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-la-russie-revendique-la-prise-du-village-d-ourojaine-qui-avait-ete-reconquis-par-kiev-en-aout-2023_6247419_3210.html
[xi] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-nuclear-deterrent/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-nuclear-deterrent
[xii] “India’s Nuclear Policy”, Rajesh Rajagopalan,
https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2009/e_06.pdf
[xiii] Frederico Carvalho, “Existential Risks: The Case of War-Climate Interactions”, 94th Executive Council Meeting of the WFSW, Évora (Portugal) July 2—7, 2023 (https://otc.pt/wp/2024/06/29/war-climate-interactions/ )
[xiv] The name is a reference to the biblical Israelite judge Samson who pushed apart the pillars of a Philistine temple, bringing down the roof and killing himself and thousands of Philistines who had captured him.
[xv] In Israel public discussion on nuclear weapons policy is subject to censorship. In the United States, a secret executive order has long “prohibited American officials from even acknowledging that Israel has nuclear arms” and “threatens present and past government employees with disciplinary action, including firing” if they do so.
https://thebulletin.org/2024/07/nuclear-danger-is-growing-physicists-of-the-world-unite/
Admission should in principle put a de facto end to the US military support to Israel under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
[xvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nkorea-passes-law-declaring-itself-nuclear-weapons-state-kcna-2022-09-08/
[xvii] What the “Kill Chain” strategy was sought to accomplish was described to South Korean media by anonymous military sources, who were likely speaking with authorization, in sufficient detail to outline its strategic purpose: “Every Pyongyang district, particularly where the North Korean leadership is possibly hidden, will be completely destroyed by ballistic missiles and high-explosive shells as soon as the North shows any signs of using a nuclear weapon. In other words, the North’s capital city will be reduced to ashes and removed from the map”. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/08/south-koreas-decapitation-strategy-against-north-korea-has-more-risks-than-benefits?lang=en
[xviii] In this regard, we quote a passage from an opinion article published in the Los Angeles Times in May 2016, entitled: “Russia is right: the US broke a NATO promise”: “In early February 1990, U.S. leaders made an offer to the Soviets. According to transcripts of meetings in Moscow, on February 9, then-Secretary of State James Baker suggested that, in exchange for cooperation with Germany, the US could give “rigid guarantees” that NATO would not expand “a centimeter to the east”. Less than a week later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to begin reunification talks. No formal agreement was reached, but by all evidence the trade-off was clear: Gorbachev acceded to Germany’s western alignment and the US would limit NATO expansion.
However, great powers rarely tie their own hands. In internal memos and notes, US policymakers quickly realized that excluding NATO expansion might not be in the interests of the United States. In late February, Bush and his advisers decided to leave the door open.”
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shifrinson-russia-us-nato-deal–20160530-snap-story.html
[xix] Indeed, nuclear warheads have a limited shelf life, which requires periodic assessment of their condition, timely removal for interim storage and possible dismantlement. These are expensive, technically demanding operations.
[xx] An amount that represents around 10 times the Portuguese GDP in 2023.
[xxi] Some will recall the famous “red telephone” between the Kremlin and the White House, from the times of the cold war, a hot-line that allowed direct communication between the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation (formerly the Soviet Union). Since 2008, the Moscow–Washington hotline has been a secure computer link over which messages are exchanged by a secure form of email.
[xxii] “The Emerging Artificial Intelligence Era Faces a Growing Threat from Directed Energy Weapons”, David C. Stoudt, Scientific American, May 23, 2024
[xxiii] There is news that swarms of armed drones have been used on the war front in eastern Europe.
[xxiv] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes
[xxv] “In the three-year siege of the city of Leningrad, which stands out for the estimated 630,000 people the Germans killed slowly and intentionally thanks to starvation and related causes.”
In “War and Famine, America’s War on Terror and the Wasting of Our Democracy”, Andrea Mazzarino, July 7, 2024
https://tomdispatch.com/war-and-famine/#more
